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PRIOR RESTRAINT IN THE DIGITAL AGE

Ariel L. Bendor· and Michal Tamir••

In this Article we argue that the digital revolution requires a reshaping of the
Doctrine ofPrior Restraint, which prohibits the implementation ofany regulations that
prevent the publication of speech prior to its distribution. We describe the prohibition
on prior restraint of speech, its rationales and its exceptions; present the characteristics of the media in the digital age; suggest that the traditional design ofthe Doctrine
does not fit these characteristics; and describe the reshaping that we propose in order
to adapt the Doctrine to the age of the Internet and social networking.
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lNTRODUCTION

This Article argues that the unique characteristics ofthe digital age justifY reshaping the Doctrine of Prior Restraint-a cornerstone of First Amendment jurisprudence--and suggests adapting the Doctrine to the age ofthe Internet and social media.
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Near v. Minnesota, 1 forbids the implementation of regulations which prevent the
publication of speech prior to its distribution, including orders to remove an expression that has already been published.2 According to the Doctrine, restrictions of
speech ordinarily should only be enforced by imposing ex post criminal or civil sanctions.3 Although it is permissible to punish certain hannfu1 expressions, such as libels,
after their dissemination, ''there are strict limitations on the constitutionality of preventing such expressions before they occur.•>4 A major implication ofthe Doctrine-on which this Article focuses-is the courts' refusal to issue injunctions against
speech on the grounds that "an injunction against speech is the very prototype of the
greatest threat to First Amendment values. " 5
First Amendment protections apply to new media.6 This is significant because
a large part of today' s opinion market is conducted online.7 Even so, the emergence
of the network society has raised substantive questions regarding the interpretation
of the First Amendment in an era when an Internet connection and a computer actualize the ability to transmit messages to potentially large audiences. 8
We argue that the digital revolution requires a reshaping of the Doctrine ofPrior
Restraint As Justice Cardozo put it almost a hundred years ago: "We do not inquire ...
'what the legislator willed a century ago, but what he would have willed if he had
1

283 U.S. 697 (1931 ). At least some aspects ofthe Prior Restraint Doctrine have far more
ancient roots thanNearv. Minnesota. See generally Michaell. Meyerson, The Neglected History
ofthe Prior Restraint Doctrine: Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and
the Separation ofPowers, 341ND. L. REv. 295,308-13,324--33 (2001); Stephen A. Siegel,
Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 655,
674--78 (2008).
1
See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul
ofthe Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 311, 340 (2011).
3
Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of
Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 289, 291 (1999).
4

Id.

5

Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 797 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884--85 (1997).
7
See W. Danny Green, Comment, The First Amendment and Cell Phones: Governmental Control over Cell Phone Use on Publicly Owned Lands, 44 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1355, 1384
(2012); Brandon Wiebe, Comment, BART's Unconstitutional Speech Restriction: Adapting
Free Speech Principles to Absolute Wireless Censorship, 4 7 U.S.F. L. REV. 195, 218 (2012).
8
See, e.g., MANuELCAS1EU.S, COMMUNICATION POWER 51 (2009); Jared Schroeder, Fo6

cusing on How Rather Than on Whom: Constructing a Process-Based Framework for Interpreting the Press Clause in the Network-Society Era, 19 COMM. L. &POL'Y 509, 510--12 (2014).
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known what our present conditions would be. "'9 Free speech rights must be molded
to address the challenges ofthe present digital age. 10
The Internet, and social media platfonns in particular, have some characteristics
that distinguish them from traditional speech and media channels. Anyone who has
access to the Internet can post expressions on a multitude ofplatfonns. Expressions
that appear on the Internet, as long as they have not been removed, have eternal exposure. Online news sources are open to everyone and access to them is not limited
to professional journalists who are subject to ethical codes. 11 The typical time gap
between writing and publication on the Internet is extremely narrow. 12 Online publications, and the damage they cause, are forever. Internet access is extremely broad,
and almost anyone, nearly anywhere, can view online publications. Posts on social
media platforms or digital publications can have a global viral effect13 and can potentially reach a huge audience through sharing. Accounting for all this, digital age
technologies may enable courts to prevent unprotected expressions, without affecting
the constitutionally protected parts of the same speech. These characteristics justify
a reshaping of the Doctrine ofPrior Restraint. 14
The escalation of the chilling effect created by the Doctrine of Prior Restraint in
the age of the Internet and social networks generates numerous difficulties. Speech
in the digital age is no longer limited to major, financially sound mass media, which
benefit from legal advice and professional self-confidence. 15 Ex post criminal or civil
sanctions, therefore, are likely to be particularly threatening to ordinary bloggers. 16
9

BENIAMINN. CARDOZO, THENA1lJREOFTHEJUDICIALPROCESS 84 (1921).
See, e.g., Eric B. Einisman, Note, Switching the Flip: Questioning the Government's
Authority to Shut Down Communication Networks in Furtherance ofPublic Safety, 31 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 184 (2012).
11
See infra text accompanying notes 102--07.
12
See, e.g., Chris Hamilton, Breaking News Guidancefor BBCJournalists, BBC (Feb. 8,
2012,2:18PM),http://www.bbc.eo.uk/blogs/theeditors/2012/02/twitter_guidelines_for_bbc
jou.html [https://perma.cc/YB9B-B86E].
13
Special difficulties arise due to the global nature ofthe new media, which is governed
by legal regimes of different cowrtries that are not mutually compatible. This Article, which is
oriented toward the constitutional law ofthe United States, does not address these difficulties,
which relate both to substantive law and to its enforcement. For a discussion ofthe difficulties
arising from the global nature ofthe Internet, see generally Allison R Hayward, Regulation
10

ofBlog Campaign Advocacy on the Internet: Comparing U.S., German, andEUApproaches,
16 CARDOZO J.INT'L & COMP. L. 379 (2008).
14

Developments related to the digital age may also justify redesigning the protections on
freedom of speech with respect to aspects that do not pertain to the Prior Restraint Doctrine.
See generally Conor M. Reardon, Note, Cell Phones, Police Recording, and the Intersection
of the First and Fourth Amendments, 63 DuKE L.J. 735 (2013) (asserting that reasonable
seizures can become unreasonable when they threaten free expression, and seizures of cell
phones used to record violent arrests are of that stripe).
15
See generally Hayward, supra note 13 (discussing the global nature of the Internet).
16
Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online
Marketplace ofIdeas, 63 U. MIAMIL. REv. 137,202 (2008).
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For parties without deep pockets, such as individuals and minor media entities, the
risk of large-scale damages may lead to economic collapse. Such a risk could have
a highly increased chilling effect on speech.
This Article suggests a reshaping ofthe Doctrine ofPrior Restraint designed to enhance the benefits provided by new media while diminishing the potential costs. 17 Our
proposal consists oftwo components. First, courts will be empowered to issue orders
to remove expressions from the Internet or from social networks, and, in exceptional
cases, to issue injunctions against unpublished expressions. Though courts will have
broad discretion on whether to issue a removal order or an injunction, they will not be
obligated to issue the order even if the conditions necessary for its issuance are met.
Second, to avoid the chilling effect and to give speakers the freedom to choose whether
to take the risk of subsequent sanctions, claims for damages will be contingent, in
accordance with the Mitigation of Damages (Avoidable Consequences) Doctrine,
upon the filing of an earlier application for an injunction or a removal order.
Part I ofthis Article describes the Doctrine ofPrior Restraint, presents its main rationales, reviews the exceptions to the prohibition on prior restraints ofspeech, and suggests that prior restraints are frequently permitted when the threat to First Amendment
values is not significant and the expected damage in the absence of prior restraint is
significant. Part II addresses the general characteristics of the media in the digital age
and suggests that the traditional model of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint does not fit
these characteristics. Part ill describes the alterations that we propose in order to adapt
the Doctrine of Prior Restraint to the age of the Internet and social networking. 18

I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROillBffiON ON PRIOR RESTRAINT AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
Prior restraint of speech is defined as restricting speech before "its dissemination
on the basis of content. " 19 The Doctrine of Prior Restraint bars any prohibition on
speech issued in advance of publication,20 as well as any determination of the legality
17

I d. For other suggestions with a purpose to reshape First Amendment doctrines in order
to adjust them to the digital age, see Lili Levi, Social Media and the Press, 90 N.C. L. REv.
1531 (2012).
18
A multitude of scholars have criticized the Doctrine of Prior Restraint. See generally
Bendor, supra note 3; John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALEL.J. 409
(1983); William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory ofFirst Amendment Process: Injunctions of
Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs ofthe Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNElL
L. REv. 245 (1982); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role ofthe Prior Restraint Doctrine in
First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L.REv. 53 (1984); Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal ofthe Doctrine ofPrior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1989). However,
this Article does not suggest the abolishment ofthe doctrine; rather, we propose how it can be
adapted to the modem digital age.
19
Nisha Chandran, Crossing the Line: When Cyberbullying Prevention Operates as a
Prior Restraint on Student Speech, U.IIL. J. L. TEcH. &POL'Y 277, 291 (2016). See also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POUCIES 978-79 (4th ed. 2011)
(citing RODNEY A. SMOllA, SMOILAANDNIMMERONF'REEooMOFSPEECH § 8-4 (1994)).
20
SeeNearv. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,721 (1931).
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of particular expressions prior to publication.21 According to the Doctrine, the government and the courts are not permitted to restrain expressions before they are
disseminated---either by administrative licensing regimes or byjudicial injunctions22even if they may be constitutionally subjected to subsequent civil or criminal
sanctions. 23 This also applies to types of expressions, such as obscenity, that are not
fully protected by the First Amendment but are defined by ambiguous and indeterminable standards.24 The Doctrine of Prior Restraint applies to the government and
courts only. 25 Private online platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter andYouTube, are
not subject to the Doctrine and generally are allowed to censor publications or use
other means of prior restraint.26
21

See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975). It has been
argued that the development of the Doctrine ofPrior Restraint shows that the Doctrine condemns only content-based restrictions. Jacob G. Fleming. Note, The Casefor a Modem Public
Forum: How the Bay Area Rapid Transit System's Wireless Shutdown Strangled Free Speech
Rights, 51 WASHBURNL.J. 631,641,641 nn74-75 (2012).
22
See 2 RODNEY A. SMOI.IA, SMOLIAAND NIMMER ON FREEDoM OF SPEECH § 15-4 to -5
(Supp. 2017); Larry Alexander, There Is No First Amendment Overbreadth (But There Are
Vague First Amendment Doctrines); Prior RestraintsAren 't "Prior"; and "As Applied" Challenges Seek Judicial Statutory Amendments, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 439,443 (2011) ("There

are two types of regulation that fall into [the prior restraint] category. One consists ofthose
requirements that one obtain a license from some agency or person before engaging in the
speech activity.... The other type of regulation deemed to be a prior restraint is the judicial
injunction or order when directed against the content of speech or its time, place, or manner.");
Douglas B. McKechnie, Facebookls Off-Limits? Criminalizing Bidirectional Communication
Via the Internet Is Prior Restraint 2.0, 461ND. L. REv. 643, 664 (2013); Al-Amyn Sumac,
Prior Restraints and Digital Surveillance: The Corutitutionality ofGag Orders Issued Under
the Stored Communications Act, 20 YALEJ.L. & TEcH. 74, 77 (20 18); Jacqueline G. Waldman,
Prior Restraint and the Police: The FirstAmendment Right to Disseminate Recordings ofPolice
Behavior, U.IIL.L.REv. 311,319--20 (2014); seealsoJackM. Ba1kin. Old-SchooVNew-School
Speech Regulation, 127 HAR.v. L. REv. 2296, 2299, 2306--29 (2014) ("[N]ew-school techniques of speech regulation have effects similar to prior restraints, even though they may not

involve traditional licensing schemes or judicial injunctions.'').
23
See Redish, supra note 18, at 53.
24
See Reardon, supra note 14, at 752 (asserting that "[t]he chief concern animating the
prior restraint doctrine is that the hand of the government censor will operate to exclude
disfavored speech before the speech reaches the public market. In the context of obscenity
seizures, this danger is particularly acute. The indefinite nature ofthe obscenity standard, and
ofstatutes that track that standard, lends itself to discretionary official action that suppresses
protected speech as well as proscribed obscenity'').
25
See Kate K.lonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech, 131 HAR.v. L. REv. 1598, 1609 (2018).
26
Seeid. at1599, l609;AndrewTutt,TheNewSpeech,4l HAsTINGSCONST.L.Q.235,238
{20 14) (''There is no baseline constitutional right to protection from private censorship, manipulation, deception, or exclusion on the hrternet because major speech platforms are neither
state actors nor 'places ofpublic accommodation,' and therefore carry no obligation to guarantee,
protect, or respect the expressive interests of the tens of millions of individuals who pass
through their domains each day."). However, it has been argued that:
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The Doctrine, therefore, creates a constitutional right to publish expressions that
are not entitled to substantive constitutional protection. These expressions may be
regulated only by ex post sanctions. 27 The significance of the Doctrine is that the
category of substantively protected speech is narrower than the category of speech
that cannot be curbed by prior restraint. 28 The Doctrine thus grants superiority to
freedom of speech over other entitlements----5uch as the rights to good reputation
and privacy-even in situations in which the expression violates these rights.
The Supreme Court has yet to offer a compelling rationale for the Doctrine ofPrior
Restraint29 As we see it, however, the main rationale seems to stem from the desire to
prevent the chilling of speech30 by censorship or similar means31 and to ensure that all
expressions are included in the marketplace of ideas.32 An efficient system of deterring
harmful speech would be undesirable ifit precluded valuable expressions from reaching
the public, thereby limiting output in the marketplace of ideas. 33 If an expression is
[I]mposing liability on infrastructure providers unless they surveil and
block speech. or remove speech that others complain about, has many features ofa prior restraint, although technically it is notidentical to a classic
prior restraint.... In this way, our twenty-first-century digital world has
recreated the prior restraints ofthe sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
offering a twenty-first-centuryversion ofadministrative priorrestraint.
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REv. 2011, 2017-19 (2018).
27
See Bendor, supra note 3, at 295. A similar "non-constitutional rule [is] that equity will
not enjoin libel." ld. at291 n.2 (citingDOUGI.ASLAYCOCK, THEDEA1HOFTIIEIRREPARABLE
INJURY RULE 164, 164 n.27 (1991)).
28
See Jeffiies, supra note 18, at 426 (noting that the Doctrine ofPrior Restraint may bar
injunctions against speech that the First Amendment does not protect).
29
Steve Tensmeyer, Constitutionalizing Equity: Consequences ofBroadly Interpreting
the "Modem Rule" ofInjunctions Against Defamation, 72 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 43,
46 (2017).
30
SeeNebraskaPressAss'nv. Stuart,427U.S. 539, 559(1976);ALExANDERM.BICKEL,
THE MORAliTY OF CONSENT 61 ( 1975) ("A criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes.");
SUSAN EASTON, THE PROBLEM OF PORNOGRAPHY: REGULATION AND 1HE RIGIIT TO FREE
SPEECH 69 (1994) (observing that "[t]he American courts ... have favoured subsequent sanctions over prior restraint because ofthe latter's chilling effect on publishers and film-makers'');
Robert A. Sedler, Self-Censorship and the First Amendment, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. E1HICS &
PuB. POL'y 13, 15 (20 11) (asserting that ''the chilling effect concept is the most fundamental
and pervasive concept in the 'law ofthe First Amendment.' ... The chilling effect concept
is the basis of ... the New York Times rule," the rule against prior restraint of speech).
31
For the close connection between censorship and prior restraint, see Derek E. Bambauer,
Orwell's Armchair, 79 U. Cm. L. REV. 863,871-72 (2012).
32
See Marla Brooke Tusk, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 1202, 1223 (2003)(asserting that "[t]he most coDDllonly touted justification of
the Court's predilection for subsequent punishment is that prior restraint does not permit certain
expression to ever enter the marketplace ofideas, thereby imposing a more significant burden
on speech").
33
See, e.g., DavidS. Ardia, Freedom ofSpeech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 WM.
&MARYL.REv.1, 74 (2013).
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banned under a system of prior restraint, it may never reach the market at all or may
have to be withheld until it is approved. 34 As Larry Alexander has pointed out, "loss
oftime ... is a real cost if one's message is time-sensitive. It is the time the speaker
must wait before speaking during which he tries to convince some court that his
speech is constitutionally protected and thus should never have been enjoined." 35
Another major rationale of the Doctrine is the Collateral Bar Rule. 36 According to
this Rule, judicial orders from courts give rise to an absolute duty of obedience, notwithstanding any constitutional rights to engage in the enjoined conduct, unless and until that order is set aside by the court that issued it or by a higher court on appeal.37 In
our opinion, however, it is difficult to view the Collateral Bar Rule alone as sufficient
justification for the prohibition ofjudicial injunctions of unprotected expressions. 38
The Rule:
does not prevent direct attacks on judicial orders on appeal or by
petition. It merely prevents indirect attacks on such orders within
the framework of contempt proceedings. In other words, a person against whom a court has issued an injunction does not lack
a remedy against that order. He [or she] may apply to a competent court and argue that the judicial order is unconstitutional ...
without his [or her] application being dismissed in limine. 39
Although it is generally agreed upon that "prior restraint on expression comes ...
with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity,'>4° the prohibition
against prior restraint is not absolute.41 Courts have approved prior restraint where
34

See, e.g., Chandran, supra note 19, at 304; Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine ofPrior
Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 657 (1955).
35
Alexander, supra note 22, at 445. According to Jack M. Balkin,"[p]rior restraints (which
include licensing schemes) are especially troublesome because they shift the costs ofaction,

the burdens of proof, and the consequences of inertia from the state to the speaker." Balkin,
supra note 22, at 2316.
36
See Alexander, supra note 22, at 444; Balkin, supra note 22, at 2317.
37
See Walkerv. Binningham, 388U.S. 307,321 (1967);Alexander,supranote22, at444;
Balkin, supra note 22, at 2317; Richard E. Labunski, The "Collateral Bar" Rule and the First
Amendment: The Constitutionality ofEnforcing Unconstitutional Orders, 37 AM. U. L. REv.
323, 327 (1988).
38
See Bendor, supra note 3, at 352-55.
39
ld. at 354.
40
Organization for aBetter Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,419 (1971). See also Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
41
See Ardia, supra note 33, at44--51; Christina E. Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law
ofInjunctions Against Expression, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 14 (2000) ("The Court's language ... suggests an equation of injunctions and prior restraints, but the Court's practice ...
included several cases in which it upheld injunctions against expression.").
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the speech is deemed obscene,42 where a prior restraint is needed to fulfill the right
to a fair trial,43 where the expression is part of an unprotected commercial speech, 44
where the speech was part of a continuing course of conduct,45 and where the expression could endanger national security in time of emergency.46 Courts have also
approved prior restraint in order to protect privacy,47 in order to prevent employment
discrimination,41 in order to protect property,49 in order to regulate public forums, 50
and in order to prevent misleading commercial expressions. 51
Courts have drawn a distinction between different forms of expression. 52 For
example, injunctions that neutrally regulate only time, place, or manner of speech
are permissible.53 Historically, permanent injunctions were not permitted in defamation actions, and damages were seen as a sufficient remedy for plaintiffs in such
cases.54 In unusual cases, however, courts have issued narrow permanent injunctions
against specific statements that were found to be defamatory. 55 Ibis issue was
42
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("[T]he primary requirements of
decency may be enforced against obscene publications.").
43
See Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 538,569--70 (1976) (''However difficult
it may be, we need not rule out the possibility of showing the kind ofthreat to fair trial rights
that would possess the requisite degree of certainty to justifY restraint.").
44
See San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230,
1239 (9th Cir. 1997).
45
See Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1208--09 (6th Cir. 1990).
46
See New York Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Alexander
Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REv. 651, 692 (2017).
47
See Porco v. Lifetime Entm't Servs., 116 A.D.3d 1264, 1266 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
48
See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 980 P.2d 846, 875 (Cal. 1999).
49
See Barlowv. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 3--9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001 ); Advanced Training Sys.
v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984); Guion v. Terra Mktg. ofNev., 523
P.2d 847,848 (Nev. 1974);Mazzoconev. Willing, 369 A.2d 829, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976),
rev'd, 393 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 1978).
50
See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 325 (2002).
51
SeeCentralHudsonGas&E1ec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,447U.S. 557,571 n.13
(1980) ("We have observed that commercial speech is such a sturdy brand ofexpression that
traditional prior restraint doctrine may not apply to it."); Amalgamated Acme Affiliates v.
Minton, 33 S.W.3d 387, 395 (Tex. App. 2000).
52
For instance, books and newspapers enjoy far greater protection from prior restraint
than films, to which the prohibition is applied more narrowly. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEMOFF'REEooMOFEXPRESSION 511-12 (1970).
53
See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 763--64 (1994). For a critique of
the Supreme Court's logic in Madsen, see OwenM. Fiss, The Unruly Character ofPolitics,
29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 1, 3--10 (1997).
54
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunctioru in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSEL. REv. 157,
167-70 (2007).
55
See McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2015); Lothschuetz v. Carpenter,
898 F.2d 1200, 1203--09 (6th Cir. 1990). For a discussion ofthe McCarthy v. Fuller decision,
see Ann C. Motto, "Equity Will Not Enjoin a Libel": Well, Actually, Yes, It Will, 11 SEVEN1H
CIR. REv. 271 (2016).
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presented to the Supreme Court but was not decided upon the death of the plaintiff,
a week after the oral arguments. 56 The Court resolved the case on narrow grounds
without deciding the question presented as to whether injunctions are permissible
in defamation cases. 51
On this background, it was asserted that:
[A]lthough the overall number of decisions granting injunctions
[in state courts] is small relative to the total number of cases in
which plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, it is clear that a trend is
emerging within both state and federal courts that permits injunctions if the speech in question was adjudged to be defamatory. 58
Nevertheless, some interpreters noted that ''the case law does indeed allow permanent injunctions of unprotected speech, entered after a final judicial finding that the
speech is unprotected, but does . . . n[o ]t allow restraints entered before such a
fmding. "59
On the contrary, case law also provides a basis for the claim that the Doctrine
of Prior Restraint forbids not only temporary preventive relief, but also permanent
injunctions against speech. 60 This argument can be supported by the Supreme
Court's ruling in Alexander v. United States. 61 In that decision, the Court stated that
56

Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005).
I d. at 737-3 8. For a discussion of Tory v. Cochran, see Charles H. Whitebread, Going
Out with a Whimper: A Term o[Tinlcering and Fine Tuning, The Supreme Court's 2004-2005
Term, 27 WHITTIER.L. REv. 77, 159--60 (2005).
58
Ardia, supra note 33, at 51.
59
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom ofSpeech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DuKE L.J. 147, 175 ( 1998). The authors point out that allegedly libelous
speech is often not subject to preliminary injunctions because no final adjudication regarding
its libelous nature can be reached at the preliminary injunction stage.Id. at 171-72; Richard
Favata, Note, Filling the VoidinFirstAmendmentJurisprudence: Is There a Solution for&placing the Impotent System of Prior Restraints?, 72 FORDHAML. REv. 169, 187 (2003)
(arguing that ''because prior restraints are generally issued prior to a full and fair hearing, it is
difficult to determine whether the speech in question is in actuality unprotected. Therefore,
prior restraints remain presumptively unconstitutional, even where the speech may be unprotected"). See also Michael J. Pollele, Racial andEthnic Group Defamation: A Speech-Friendly
Proposal, 23 B.C.llnRD WORIDL.J. 213,245 (2003) (asserting that "some sparse authority
suggests an injunction might lie against further repetitions of a defamation once the plaintiff
has secured a jury verdict").
~ 0 See, e.g., Corinne Stuart, Comment, The Applicability ofthe Prior !restraint Doctrine to
False Advertising Law, 21 GEO. MAsON L. REv. 531, 546--47 (2014); see also Michael I.
Meyerson, RewritingNearv. Minnesota: Creating a Complete Definition o[Prior !restraint, 52
MERCERL. REv. 1087, 1137 (200 1) (pointing out that ''injunctive reliefgenerally is unavailable
for libel plaintiffs, even those seeking to silence statements previously adjudged to be libelous'').
~I 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
51
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''permanent injunctions--i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities-are
classic examples ofprior restraints" because they place a ''restraint on future speech. " 62
The prohibition on prior restraint of speech is therefore neither rigid nor based
on a dogmatic approach. Prior restraints are frequently permitted when the threat to
First Amendment values is not significant and the expected damage in the absence
of prior restraint is significant.

II. THE COMPATIBILITY OF TilE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR
RESTRAINT WITH THE DIGITAL AGE

Andrew Shapiro outlines six characteristics of the digital age: many-to-many
interactivity, flexibility, packet-based distribution networks, interoperability, large
bandwidth or carrying capacity, and universality.63 These digital tools reveal a new
existence--t"ather than a mere modification or perfection--of the old one.64
New sources of media have emerged in the digital age. Although lines between
forms of media are blurring, 65 it can be said that, while "old media" refers to print
newspapers, radios, and television broadcasts,66 the term ''new media'' conveys a sense
of the ability to broadcast in digital media and to do so instantly and to a global audience "online."67 The term ''new media" encompasses an expanding and diversifYing
set of applied communication technologies. 68 The new media bring together technological artifacts or devices, activities, practices or uses, and social arrangements or
organizations that form around the devices and practices.69 Its main features seem to
be its interconnectedness, accessibility to individual users as senders or receivers, interactivity, multiplicity ofuse, open-ended character, ubiquity, and delocatedness. 70
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint was established and shaped in a communication
world dominated by the old media.71 However, media revolution has occurred over
the last several decades and the world of communication in which the Doctrine of
62

Id. at 550.
ANDREWL. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROLREVOLUTION: HOWTIIEINTERNETIS PuTTINGINDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING 1HE WORLD WE KNOW 15--17 (1999).
64
See Shulamit Almog, Creating Representations of Justice in the Third Millennium:
Legal Poetics in Digital Times, 32 RUTGERS CoMPUTER& TEcH. L.J. 183, 189 (2006).
~' David A. Anderson, Freedom ofthe Press, 80 TEX. L. REv. 429, 43 8 (2002). The term
''media" itself is difficultto define. See Daniel Joyce, Media Witnesses: Human Rights in an
Age ofDigital Media, 81NTERCULTURALHUM. RTS. L. REv. 231, 233 (2013).
66
See PETER STEVEN, T'HENO-NONSENSEGUIDETOGLOBALMEDIA27-30, 67 (2003);
Emily Anne Vance, Should Prosecutors Blog, Post, Or Tweet?: The Need For New Restraints
In Light OfSocial Media, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 367, 370 n.16 (2015).
67
See STEVEN, supra note 66, at 72-73.
68
DENISMCQUAIL,MCQUAIL'SMAsSCoMMUNICATIONT'HEORYPart2.6(6thed.2010).
69
STEVEN, supra note 66, at 72-75.
70 ld.
71
See Favata, supra note 59, at 173-74 (describing how the Doctrine of Prior Restraint
developed in early American law as a reaction to English practices).
~

3
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Prior Restraint was developed has been dramatically altered. 72 The need to remodel the
Doctrine does not necessarily indicate a change in values. It grew out ofthe media revolution, which weakened certain assumptions underlying the Doctrine in its traditional
formulation and involved some substantial developments that need to be addressed. 73
In this Part, we describe and shed light on some prominent characteristics of the
media in the digital age and discuss aspects in which unique characteristics of the
new media may justify reshaping the Doctrine of Prior Restraint.

A. Increased Chilling Effect on Ordinary Speakers
Anyone with network access can post expressions on the Internet and social
media platforms. Certainly, "[n]o longer [does] one need the permission of a narrow
set of editors who control[] television channels or newspaper pages. "74 Any individual with a computer can launch a post to a website. 75 According to Justice Stevens,
the Internet "provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of
all kinds.... Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the
same individual can become a pamphleteer."76 As a result, the Internet has evolved
into "the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country-and indeed the world-has yet seen. "77
A significant number oflntemet speakers, such as most Facebook contributors
and Tweeters, are not even quasi-joumalists. 78 In most instances, such speakers do
72

See Steven J. Venezia, The Interaction ofSocial Media and the Law and How to Survive
the Social Media Revolution, 52 N.H. B.J. 24, 24 (2012) (noting major media developments
since 1971 ); see also Balkin, supra note 22, at 2296.
73
Cf. Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to
the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YAIEL.J.1639, 1670-76 (1995).PartiV, entitled:
"Threats to an Online Agora: Rethinking Some Principles of First Amendment Practice,"
describes First Amendment developments arising out of media changes. !d.
74
Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Free Speech, 100 IOWAL. REv. 501, 506 (20 15). But
see Lev~ supra note 17, at 1562 (describing the "decline ofthe traditional editorial role" of
the old media due to the rise ofthe new media).
75
See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory ofFreedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2004) (pointing out that
"[l]arge numbers of people can broadcast and publish their views cheaply and widely....
[T]he development ofweblogs (or blogs) allows people to publish content to the Internet
with the press of a button, lowering the costs ofpublication and distribution even further");
Larry E. Rib stein, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics ofAmateur Journalism,
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185, 187 (2006).
76
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
77
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
78
For discussions ofthe status ofbloggers as journalists, see, e.g., Howard Fineman, Who
is a "Journalist"?, 4 FIRsT AMEND. L. REv. 1 (2005); Anne Flanagan, Blogging: A Journal
Need Not a Journalist Make, 16 FORDHAM INTEI.L. PROP. MEDIA & ENr. L.J. 395 (2006);
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not consciously target their expressions to a mass audience. 79 In practice, however,
their posts-which in most cases are not of any journalistic nature--may reach a
huge audience and even become viral. 80
A difficulty lies in the escalation of the chilling effect created, in this new age,
by the Doctrine of Prior Restraint in its traditional design. The Doctrine forbids the
freezing of expressions by banning the issuance of anti-speech injunctions. 81 However, it deters many lawful expressions as a result of the fear of exposure to subsequent sanctions. 82 The Doctrine therefore has a chilling effect, "which occurs when
a governmental action has the indirect effect of deterring a speaker from exercising
her [or his] First Amendment rights."83 While a "chilling effect" on speech can be
defined in general terms as a "collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual ... more reluctant to exercise it,"84 chilling effects
are undesirable as long as they also deter people from protected expressions. 85 Indeed, chilling expression may be a far more serious issue than prior restraint. 86
Thus, for instance, "[b]ecause the standards for awarding presumed damages in
defamation cases are somewhat elusive, appellate courts have difficulty in evaluating
claims that damages awards are excessive. The consequence is that the courts are generally liberal in evaluating the awards. " 87 "Consequential damages from defamation
are usually speculative and always uncertain in amount."88 Before the rise ofthe new
media, the accessibility of public speech was limited to financially sound mass
media, which had readily available legal advice and professional self-confidence. 89 The
birth of the new media, in contrast, dramatically increased the accessibility of speech
to a wider range of people.9 For the general public, individual bloggers, and the

°

Anastasia Heeger, Securing a Journalist's Testimonial Privilege in the International Criminal
Court, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 209 (2005).
19
DANIEL!. SOLOVE, 1HEFuruRE OF REPUTATION: GoSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRivACY ON
THE INTERNET 61 (2007).
10
Id. at62.
81
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).
82
See, e.g., Bendor, supra note 3, at 329-31; Mayton, supra note 18, at 253-54; Frederick
Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effoct," 58 B.U. L.
REv. 685, 728 (1978).
83
See Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem ofPrivate Action, 66 VAND.
L. REv. 1473, 1474 (2013).
84
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
15 Id.
86
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1041 n.16 (2d ed. 1988).
87
See Michael K. Steenson, Presumed Damages in Defamation Law, 40 WM. MITCHElL
L. REv. 1492, 1516 (2014).
81
Douglas Laycock, The Death ofthe I"eparable Injury Rule, 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 687,
744 (1990).
89
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, New Media in Old Battles? Barron's Contextual First
Amendment and Copyright in the Digital Age, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 952, 964 (2008).
90
Balkin, supra note 22, at 2304.
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unorganized media characteristic of this new media, ex post criminal or civil sanctions are particularly more threatening. 91 For those without deep pockets, the risk of
large-scale damages may lead to economic collapse. 92 Such a risk may impact their risk
management, potentially heightening instances of the chilling effect on speech.
In terms ofa IIlllik:etplace ofideas, a significant chilling effect may be considerably
worse than the freezing effect of injunctions. An injunction is focused on a specific
expression and is only issued after a court fmds that the expression, at least prima
facie, is not constitutionally protected. 93 In contrast, the vagueness of the distinction
between protected and unprotected expressions, as well as ordinary people's fear of
subsequent criminal or civil sanctions, may prevent them from publishing even protected speech or may motivate them to remove such speech after receiving a warning
that they will be sued ifthey do not delete it.94 This may reduce, rather than expand,
the scope of opinions in the digital age.
In order to prevent chilling of protected expressions, the Supreme Court has
developed the Overbreadth Doctrine, 95 according to which speakers can challenge
a statute on the basis that it would be impermissible as applied to others, but not to
themselves.96 The principal purpose of the Overbreadth Doctrine is to protect third
parties--who might fear prosecution under an overbroad statute-from self-censoring
constitutionally protected speech. 97 Chilling effects have also been invoked by the
courts in "a wide variety of contexts to justifY customized adjustments of particular
legal rules in light of their purported uncertainties. •>9S As Leslie Kendrick puts it:
[T]he term "chilling effect" refers to a concern that an otherwise
legitimate rule will curb protected expression outside its ambit.
This phenomenon generally arises when would-be speakers,
faced with the uncertainties of the legal process, refrain from
Cioll~ supra note 16, at 202.
ld.
Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 171.
94
Cf Alexander, supra note 22, at 439-41 (arguing that vague First Amendment tests
chill free speech, not overbreadth).
95
See, e.g., RA.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,402 (1992) (White, J., concurring) ("The
overbreadth doctrine has the redeeming virtue ofattempting to avoid the chilling ofprotected
expression.''); Massachusettsv. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989)("0verbreadthis a judicially
created doctrine designed to prevent the chilling of protected expression.").
96
For the Overbreadth Doctrine, see, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767--69
(1982); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv.
235,261-79 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense ofOverbreadth, 100 YALEL.J.
853 (1991); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth Facial Challenges and the Valid
Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 359 (1998); Harvard Law Review Forum, Overbreadth
and Listeners' Rights, 123 HAR.v. L. REv. 1 (2010).
97
See Oakes, 491 U.S. at 581.
98
See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1633, 1655 (2013).
91

92
93
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making protected statements. This is an evil of constitutional
proportions because free speech is an affmnative value, which
the government has a particular obligation to promote, or at least
not to deter. 99
It seems that, as in other contexts, the courts have shaped First Amendment doctrines in order to minimize the chilling of protected expressions. 100 This should also
be done with respect to the Doctrine of Prior Restraint in the digital age.

B. The Lesser Impact ofJournalistic Ethics on Ordinary Bloggers
The fact that many printed and broadcast media have Internet editions 101 does
not limit the openness of the Internet to additional forms of media. Bloggers and
other new media speakers direct their texts to a wide public. However, ordinary
bloggers often lack the professionalism associated with traditional forms ofmedia. 102
The writings of such bloggers are not published on institutionalized sites, hence are
not subject to professional editing or journalistic standards. 103 In this respect, most
99

ld.

° For example, one might note the concern ofthe Second Circuit about the chilling ofpro-

10

tected expression that might result if schools are given the authority to punish speech that
occurs off-campus. See Thomas v. Bd. ofEduc., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The
risk is simply too great that school officials will punish protected speech and thereby inhibit
future expression.'').
101
See Barb Palser, We've Only Just Begun, 24 AM. JOURNALISM REv. 39 (2002); Levi,
supra note 17, at 1533.
102
See Sunny Woan, The Blogosphere: Past, Present, and Future. Preserving the Unfettered Development ofAlternative Journalism, 44 CAL. W. L. REv. 477, 484 (2008).
103
See, e.g., Steven Keslowitz, The Transformative Nature ofBlogs and Effect on Legal
Scholarship, 2009 CARDOZO L. REv. DE Novo 252, 268 (noting the fact "that blawgs [legal
blogs] ... lack a viable mechanism for filtering content by means of a sustained, methodical
selection and editing process"); Lee F. Peoples, The Citation ofBlogs in Judicial Opinions,
13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTEIL PROP. 39, 51 (2010) (noting that "comments in blogs lack the
editing ... oflawjournals"); see also Adam Cohen, The Media That Need Citizens: The First
Amendment and the Fifth Estate, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 78 (2011) (noting that "[n]etworked approaches to editing news may not be much worse than the old media model"); Lili Levi, A
New Modelfor Media Criticism: Lessonsfrom the Schiavo Coverage, 61 U. MIAMIL. REv. 665,
691 (2007) (observing that"[o]ne does not need to be a professional journalist to be a blogger;
many well-known bloggers are not and do not operate under traditionaljournalistic standards
and ethics''); Robert M O'Neil, The Drudge Case: A Look at Issues in Cyberspace Defamation,
73 WASH.L.REv. 623,624 (1998) ("[a]nonlinejownalistpublishes informally, lacking editors,
lavvyers and many ofthe other indicia oftraditional print or broadcast medium ... .'');Benjamin
J. Wischnowski, Note, Bloggers with Shields: Reconciling the Blogosphere 's Intrinsic Editorial
Process with Traditional Concepts ofMedia Accountability, 91 IOWAL. REv. 327, 329, 344
(2011) (arguing that due to "the concomitant lack of uniform editorial standards" in blogs,
"[t]he separate test for bloggers would direct courts, as an initial matter, to assess peer review
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speakers in the new media differ from journalists in the established printed and
broadcast media Journalists working under the umbrella oftraditional media "typically
operate subject to a set of ethical and professional norms, made explicit in a host of
ethical codes and, more importantly, absorbed by individual journalists in a deeply
embedded sense of professional identity that shapes and constrains their actions. " 104
Indeed, the average blogger is a diarist who does not follow any code of ethics. 105
A similar rationale led the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to refrain from applying
the rules it adopted in 2009 106 for "consumer-generated media" to journalists who
work for newspapers, magazines, or television and radio stations, which-in contrast
to the new media-have independent editorial responsibility and, as a result, are
more trustworthy than those without it. 107
The internal norms of the old media "are a far better predictor of the nature and
limits of press behavior than any norms that could be imposed from the top down
by the courts." 108 Accordingly, there has been a call for "new media outlets that do
want to be taken seriously as news providers ... to establish their credibility as a
journalistic source," by adopting ethical policies similar to those of the established
old media 109 Even though, hypothetically speaking, ''journalism ethics codes may
provide a useful model"110 for "bloggers and others with the capacity to invade privacy," the ability to motivate speakers in the new media to adopt and apply ethical
norms seems extremely limited.u 1 Even if such a proposal has any feasibility for
and blogger-to-blogger collaboration--both ofwhich are a form ofeditorial oversight, albeit
horizontal"). As for traditional books, see Michael J. Kelly & David Satola, The Right to Be
Forgotten, 2017 U.IIL. L. REv. 1, 13 (''Traditional publication processes also contain screening
devices through layers of editing and peer review that help ensure accuracy. Alternatively,
electronic news sources, websites, blogs, and other Internet sources can instantaneously spring
up without the underlying support of screening from editors and publishing houses.").
104
Paul Horwitz, "Or ofthe [Blog] ", 11 NEXUS J. OP. 45, 59 (2006). See also Blake D.
Morant, The Endemic Reality of Media Ethics and Self-Restraint, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L.
Ennes & PuB. POL'Y 595 (2005).
105
See SOLOVE, supra note 79, at 24, 59.
106
Guides Concerning the Use ofEndorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F .R
§ 255 (2009).
107
See Cohen, supra note 103, at 2-3. This stands in conflictwithEllen Goodman's assertion,
in an article published in 2006, that "[o]nee bloggers become the conduits for paid promo-

tions, the extent to which they truly function outside the commercial media is questionable. For
now, ... it may well be fitting to exempt [bloggers] from sponsorship and other disclosure
requirements ... at least until their role in public discourse and the Internet regulatory apparatus becomes clearer." Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85
TEx. L. REv. 83, 151 (2006).
108
Horwitz, supra note 104, at 59.
109
Cohen, supra note 103, at 76.
110
Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation
ofthe Press, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 1039, 1103 (2009).
m A question that this Article does not address concerns the enforcement of content restrictions on Internet speakers, including by means of prior restraint, by intermediaries such
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those new media of an institutionalized nature, it is certainly not applicable to any
"individual who Tweets from the scene of a natural disaster or who occasionally
posts amateur videos ofprotests."112
The target audience for legal regulation concerning new media is fundamentally
different from that with respect to the traditional media. The Doctrine of Prior Restraint in its current formulation was developed in a society characterized by institutionalized media hierarchically structured with a dominant role for editors and
guided by journalistic ethics. The Doctrine, which limits the involvement of the
judiciary in enforcing rights, such as the right to good reputation and to privacy, to
ex post criminal and civil sanctions, was not intended for a reality in which infringement of such protected entitlements is not exceptional. In a media environment
where self-subordination to ethical norms is not common, it is necessary to reshape
the constitutional rules.

C. Ease and Immediacy ofPublication
The convenient and immediate use of a widely accessible social platform allows
participants to easily create a global harm. 113 A tort or an offense committed by
online means is accomplished by typing a hasty post and pressing "send."114 Unlike
a book or a newspaper article, which demands time to write and is usually accompanied by research and revisions, posts on social media are written casually and spontaneously.115 Furthermore, writing a book or an investigative journal article is usually
as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. For discussions on this issue, see, e.g., Raphael CohenA1magor, The Role ofInternet Intermediaries in Tackling Terrorism Online, 86 FORDHAM
L. REv. 425 (2017). Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 1996, Internet
service providers are not responsible for heels published through the use oftheir services, even
iftheytakeonsome editorialrolewithrespecttothe content. 47 U.S.C.§ 230(cX1) (2012). Despite the section, private expression-platforms restrict the freedom ofexpression oftheir users
by means ofprior restraint. SeeNote, The Impermeable Life: Unsolicited Communications in the
Marketplaceofideas, 118HARv.L.REv.1314, 1315--16,1332-33 (2005)(notingthatlnternet
service providers can use filtering technologies to screen individuals from information).
112
Cohen, supra note 103, at 76.
113
See, e.g., Frank D. Lomonte, Fouling the First Amendment: Why Colleges Can't, and
Shouldn't, Control Student Athletes' Speech on Social Media, 9 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 1, 2 (2014)
(explaining, that with respect to campus regulators, "[w]hat makes social media novel and
empowering--that it is an immediate, unfiltered way to 'speak' with thousands ofpeople at
once-is also what makes it frightening ...."); Graham H. Ryan, Comment, What Went
Wrong on the World Wide Web: The Crossroads ofEmerging Internet Technologies and
AttorneyAdvertisinginLouisiana, 71 LA.L.REV. 749,755 (2011)(mentioning''immediate
publication" as a benefit of advertising on the Internet).
114
See, e.g., Jennifer Westhoff, Consideration ofLegal Ethics in Using Social Media, 38
Los .ANGELES LAw. 9, 9 (2015) ("Social media are by nature casual and hasty forms of
communication.").
ns See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 UTAH
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accompanied by editing and legal advice. 116 In contrast, writers of quick social media
posts rarely receive such editing or advice. 117 New media platforms shorten the distance
from a thought to its actuation in writing. With the unbearable ease oftapping the keyboard, almost any computer-literate person can commit a criminal offense or a
tortious breach. 118 For example, it has been recognized that even "[b]ombmaking information is literally at the fingertips of anyone with access to a home computer
equipped with a modem."119
The ease and immediacy of speech in the digital age leads to hasty and impulsive
publications, particularly on social media platforms, as well as in talk-backs. 120 The
value of such expressions to the marketplace of ideas and information is often
limited. 121 With regard to unprotected expressions--on the makers of which the
L. REv. 993, 1017 ("[A]nonymity and the ease and pace of the Internet may encourage
impulsive behavior.'').
116
See, e.g., EllynM. Angelotti, TwibelLaw: WhatDefamationandltsRemediesLookLike
intheAgeofTwitter, 13 J.HIGHTEcH.L. 433,451 (2013)("Intheworldofpassivepublication, the editorial process provides time, edits and checks for a writer during the storytelling
process. Many media companies allocate substantial resources to ensure high journalistic
quality and accuracy. Copy editors are specifically devoted to catching and correcting errors;
upper-level editors guide the content and help the writer make tough ethical calls prior to
publication-especially regarding sensitive content Many media companies even have lawyers
on hand to consult about questionable stories and situations throughout the process and also
review stories before publication.''). See also Susan P. Shapiro, Libel Lawyers as Risk Counselors: Pre-publication and Pre-broadcast Review and the Social Construction ofNews, 11 L.
& POL'y 281, 288--89 (1989) (an overview ofthe process ofpre-publication or pre-broadcast
review in an article published before the age of social media).
117
See, e.g., HeidiFrostestsd Kuehl, Free Speech and Defamation in an Era ofSocialMedia:
An Analysis ofFederal and Rlinois Norms in the Context ofAnonymous Online Defamers, 36
N. IlL. U. L. REv. 28, 34 (2016) ("Under the current structure of dissemination of information
in the virtual world, individuals could presumably anonymously create or post false online
statements on a social media site or through an Internet Service Provider ("ISP") without any
editing or direct recourse by the ISP or social media site ....").
118
Vincent Angermeier, Comment, Swingingfor the Fences: How Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. Missed the Ball on Digital Sources, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1587, 1616 (201 0).
119
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPoRT ON THE AVAILABllJTY OF BOMBMAKING INFORMATION, THE EXTENT TO WinCH ITS DISSEMINATION IS CONTROlLED BY FEDERAL LAW, AND
1HE ExTENT TO WinCH SUCH DISSEMINATIONMAYBE SUBJECT TO REGULATION CoNSISTENT
WTIH 1HE FIRsT AMENDMENT TO TIIE UNITED STATES CONS1TIUTION at i, 7 (1997), http://
cryptome.org/abi.htm [https://perma.cc/28BU-PBE2]. See also Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist
Speech and the Future ofFree Expression, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 233, 281 (2005).
120
See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, Website Design and Liability, 52 JURIME1RICS 383, 384 (2012)
(pointing out that a regrettable online behavior which has emerged within the last decade is
''the impulsive posting ofimages or information (about oneselfor others) without consideration
of context or long-term implications''); Rodney K. Smith & Patrick A Shea, Religion and the
Press: Keeping First Amendment Values in Balance, 2002 UTAHL.REv.l77, 207 (asserting
that"[w]ith the rise ofthe internet and other new technologies, these pressures will be intensified, resulting in an increasing desire to get the news out 'Faster! Faster!"').
121
Cody Delistraty, Has the Internet Broken the Marketplace ofIdeas? Rethinking Free

1172

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RlGIITS JOURNAL

[Vol. 27:1155

Constitution allows the imposition of sanctions--the weight of considerations that
underlie the prohibition on prior restraint of speech is reduced.

D. Eternity, Broad Access, and Virality
The Doctrine ofPrior Restraint was originally created and designed in an environment with a relatively short-term memory. 122 The damage caused by a printed or broadcasted speech was significant until another headline replaced it and the speech was
naturally forgotten. 123 In contrast, as long as expressions appearing on the Internet are
not removed, they have eternal exposure. 124 As the character ofErica Albright put it in
the film The Social Network:. "The [I]nternet's not written in pencil ... it's written in
ink ...." 125 "[T]he Internet rarely forgets." 126 An online infringement is ongoing. 127
Posts that were displayed online decades ago can seriously harm a person today.
Additionally, Internet access is extremely wide. 128 Almost anyone, nearly anywhere, can be exposed to the Internet and can view blogs and social media posts. As
a result, damages caused by new media releases may be greatly enhanced. While books
and newspapers are usually accessible only to those who buy them or are exposed
to them by chance, the Internet is accessible to nearly every child in the modem
world. 129 The extent ofthe damage may therefore be huge, in light ofboth the number
Speech in the Digital Age, DocuMENTJ. (Nov. 5, 2018), http://www.documentjoumal.com

/2018/11/has-the-intemet-broken-the-marketplace-of-ideas-rethinking-free-speech-in-the-digi
tal-age [https://permacc/QQV6-5FAU].
122
Compare that to today' s landscape, where some see the establishment of a ''right to be
forgotten" as the only way to extinguish negative stories. Jeffery Toobin, The Solace ofOblivion, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29
/solace-oblivion [https://perma.cc/VBN3-SCSQ].
123

See id.
See Jennifer Spencer, No Service: Free Speech, the Communications Act, and BART's
Cell Phone Network Shutdown, 27 BERKElEY TECH. L.J. 767, 789-90 (2012) (pointing out
124

that"[s]peech may remain on the Internet for a long period oftime, and illegal activity stemming from it may not occur right after the posting of the content'').
m 1liE SOCIAL NETWORK (Sony Pictures 201 0).
126
Andrew L. Roth, Upping the Ante: RethinldngAnti-SLAPPLaws in the Age ofthelntemet,
2016 B.Y.U. L. REv. 741, 754.
127
See Ernest Drucker, Drug Law, Mass Incarceration, and Public Health, 91 OR. L. REv.
1097, 1114-15 (2013) (explaining, regarding child pornography, that "[a]s these films and
photos are widely distributed on the Internet, where they remain in permanent circulation,
they come to constitute a long-term assault on these children's lives as they grow into adults.
By constantly re-stimulating the victim's trauma into adulthood, this market continues a source
of ongoing damages done by the initial production'').
128
Internet World Stats, Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNET WORID STATS,
https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm [https://perma.cc/ZT2G-LEQV] (last visited
Apr. 11, 2019) (stating that, as of June 30, 2018, there were 4,208,571,287 Internet users
around the world).
129
UNICEF, CHILDREN IN A DIGITAL WORID 1 (2017) (''Children and adolescents under
18 account for an estimated one in three internet users around the world.'').
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of people exposed to the publications and the inability to conceal them from people
immediately affected by them. In the past, parents who wanted to keep their children
from being exposed to offensive information could hide the newspaper or prevent
them from watching television. Today, every child who has a smartphone can access
that information on the Internet or through a social media platform.
The sophisticated and efficient search engines, characterizing the digital age,
make access to new media much easier too. 130 Indeed:
[I]fthere are some controversial items in a book about a subject
or person, it probably is not highlighted in the way that a Google
search would retrieve the items. Unless it appears in electronic
form or on Google Books, a book would need to be inspected to
physically find the controversial information, but a search engine can take web users instantaneously to the precise location
ofthe information in question. 131
General publications on the Internet and social media posts in particular might
become globally viral. 132 The term ''virality" is a description of ''the quick permeation of thoughts, information, and trends into and through a human population."133
"[O]nce a rumor takes hold in cyberspace, it may be almost impossible to root out."134
The information in the new media comes out and is received at a tremendous speed;
indeed, as Andrew Roth puts it, ''viral content shared via social networks spreads much
like an epidemic, spilling over from one network to another in rapid succession."135
Monetary compensation is not necessarily an effective remedy for ongoing and
even viral harm. 136 Criminal punishment is also incapable ofdealing with an offense,
the consequences ofwhich continue to develop after its perpetration in a manner that
13

° Kelly & Satola, supra note 103, at 13.

Id.
See, e.g., Amy Kristin Sanders, Fast Forward Fifty Years: Protecting Uninhibited,
Robust, and W'uie-Open Debate after New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 48 GA. L. REv. 843,
844-45 (2014).
133
Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Petitions and Institutional Legitimacy, 37 CARDOZOL.
REv. 891' 926 (20 16).
134
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace,
49 DuKEL.J. 855,885 (2000).
135
Roth, supra note 126, at 754.
136
See Mary Margaret Giannini, Slaw AcidDrips and Evidentiary Nightmares: Smoothing
Out the Rough Justice ofChild Pornography Restitution with a Presumed Damages Theory,
49 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1723, 1741-42 (2012); Elad Pe1ed, Rethinking the Continuing Violation
Doctrine: The Application ofStatutes a/Limitations to Continuing Tort Claims, 41 OmoN.U.
L. REv. 343, 383-86 (2015) (arguing that, "[w]here a prospectively continuing violation of
the plaintiff's rights is recognized," the preferred remedy should be "systematic employment
of injunctive relief. Within that reliefthe court would order the defendant to put an end to
the injurious state of affairs by ceasing his conduct").
131

132
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is not necessarily predictable. 137 Truly, "[t]he prior restraint rules limit plaintiffs to
less effective remedies because we fear overenforcement of rules against offensive
speech. . . . Courts do not forbid prior restraints because other remedies are adequate, but because they are affirmatively hostile to prior restraints!'138 The tremendous and eternal global exposure and potential virality of the new media increase the
harmfulness inherent in unprotected expressions on the Internet. 139 They also significantly reduce the inherently limited effectiveness ofimposing damages and criminal
punishment for publication of digital expressions. 140 Given the concern with respect
to the chilling effect ofthese subsequent sanctions, 141 the justification for exempting
speech in the new media from the policy that usually avoids any prior restraint
remedies--even for unprotected expressions-is magnified.
137
Giannini, supra note 136, at 1742 (describing child pornography victims' difficulty in
articulating ongoing harms related to knowledge of images being possessed).
131
Laycock, supra note 88, at 744--45. Laycock asserts that:
On the usual criteria of irreparable injury, both damages and criminal
prosecution are grossly inadequate. Money damages cannot replace a
reputation once lost, or erase emotional distress once suffered. Neither
can be accurately valued in dollars. Consequential damages from defamation are usually speculative and always uncertain in amount. Both
because the thing lost is irreplaceable and because the loss is hard to
measure, damages are an obviously inadequate remedy for defamation.
The same analysis could be applied to any other category ofunprotected
speech.... Criminal punishment neither undoes the hann nor compensates for it. It may provide revenge or deterrence, but it is not a
remedy. Thus, the subsequent remedies for speech torts and speech
crimes are grossly inadequate, in the sense in which adequacy is usually
measured under the irreparable injury rule.

!d.
139

See, e.g., Winhkong Hua, Note, Cybermobs, Civil Conspiracy, and Tort Liability, 44
FORDHAMURB. L.J. 1217, 1218 (2017) ("The Internet allows individuals to be hurt in ways
that simply did not previously exist. Several examples demonstrate the new types of harms
that have become available when people use the Internet as a tool of harassment: from false
accusations, gender discrimination, and inexplicable ire, to the scorning ofpeople who tread
past certain social norms.''); Roth, supra note 126, at 7 54-55 (20 16) ("[T]he Internet also has
the potential to drastically amplify the harms caused by libelous statements. This is because
the Internet increases the ability of ordinary users to cause significantly more reputational
damage than would be possible with traditional media. . . . Two other peculiar aspects of
Internet discourse make defamatory statements published online particularly volatile: virality
and permanence. First, the potential for libel to 'go viral' augments the harm to defamation
victims by exponentially expanding the reach of libelous statements.... Indeed, viral content
shared via social networks spreads much like an epidemic, spilling over from one network
to another in rapid succession.... Next, the Internet rarely forgets.").
140
See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80
WASIL L. REv. 335,336 (2005) ("Cyberspace offers unscrupulous people an entirely new
venue in which to conduct harmful activities without a significant chance ofbeing identified,
let alone punished.").
141
See supra Section II.A.
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E. Technical Ability to Separate Protected from Unprotected Speech
Digital technologies enable the courts to separate unprotected expressions from
the constitutionally protected parts of speech and to remove only the former of such
expressions. 142 Deleting or altering parts of expressions in the old media, such as
parts of an article in a printed newspaper or book, is very difficult to implement in
practice. In contrast, the new digital technologies are built to alter or remove specific
fragments of speech or even a few words. 143 Courts can easily order the deletion or
alteration of parts of a post or a blog. 144 Just as the technological revolution that gave
rise to the digital age changed the media in a way that would justify a previously
problematic prior restraint, so too, can the new technologies moderate the means of
prior restraint and reduce them to the least necessary level.
The proposed separation between protected and unprotected speech is an analogy
drawn from the constitutional Severability Doctrine. 145 This Doctrine:
allows a court to excise any unconstitutional clauses or applications from a statute, leaving the remainder in force ifthe legislature would prefer that result to the statute's total invalidation.
This makes possible as-applied adjudication and allows a court
to save as much of a statute as it possibly can. 146
Just as a court may abolish only the unconstitutional parts of a law by exercising the
Severability Doctrine, new technologies allow the court to order the deletion of only
the constitutionally unprotected parts of text from the network.
142

See, e.g., TheDigitalMillenniumCopyrightAct, 17U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E)(i)(limiting
the liability of an internet service provider that voluntarily, or by court order, removes or
disables access to content that violates the Act).
143
See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan, Do Easy Cases Malee Bad Law? Antitrust Innovations
or Missed Opportunities in United States v. Microsoft, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1042, 1058
(2001) (pointing out that"[a]lthough Microsoft would not delete the IE source code (i.e., the
computer program) from its copies ofWindows 95, it agreed to delete that part ofthe source
code that would display the IE icon on the Windows 95 screen, or desktop, so consumers
would not automatically presume that IE was on the computer'').
144
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E)(i).
14
' David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 16 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 639, 639
(2008).
146
I d. See also, e.g., Hannah Garden-Monheit, Comment, Using Severability Doctrine to
Solve the Retroactivity Unit-of-Analysis Puzzle: A Dodd-Frank Case Study, 80 U. Cm. L. REV.
1885, 1887 (2013) (asserting that ''in the severability contextjudicial modesty recommends an
assumptionthat statutory provisions are independent ofone another"); Kenneth A. Klukowski,
Severability Doctrine: How Much ofa Statute Should Federal Courts Invalidate?, 16 TEx.
REv. L. & POL. 1, 3 (20 11) (pointing out that "[e]ach time a court strikes down a statutory provision, it must determine whether to invalidate only the unconstitutional provision, or instead
whether to invalidate the statute in its entirety or in substantial part. Severability is the doctrine
of determining whether part or all of a statute can survive without the invalid provision'').
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ill. ADAPTING TIIE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINT TO TIIE DIGITAL AGE
In accordance with the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, governmental and judicial
authorities are required to make significant efforts to use less speech-restrictive means
to address public and private concerns before taking more extreme measures such
as a network-wide shutdown. 147
The development ofthe new media requires adapting and updating legal doctrines
developed in the past. 148 Thus, "censorship is seen as anathema to deeply held beliefs
about the importance ofunfettered discourse and free expression." 149 Even so, "[s]hould
the government censor the Net, ... it should do so directly-using legislation that is
tailored to the problem, that incorporates safeguards informed by the history ofprior restraint, and that creates a system that is open, transparent, narrow, and accountable."150
In this Part, we propose a twofold reshaping of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint,
tailored to the distinctive characteristics of the digital age and the new media. The
proposed reshape does not address the aspect of the Doctrine that focuses on the
prohibition on administrative licensing of speech, since the development ofthe new
media does not justifY such a reshape. Our proposal addresses the aspect of the
Doctrine that relates to judicial orders and injunctions. We believe there is room for
adapting the Doctrine to the characteristics of the digital age.
Indeed, not all the characteristics of the new media, as described and discussed
in Part ll, apply to any expression in this media However, the two proposals described below apply to any expression that appears or is intended to appear on the
Internet or in the social media, since every expression in the new media has at least
some of these characteristics. Only in rare cases are expressions in the current era
not published or expected to be published on the Internet or social networks.
Therefore, in practice, our suggestions apply to all sorts of expression.

A. Granting Judicial Injunctions and Removal Orders Concerning Speech in the
New Media
Due to the immediacy of expression in the new media and other characteristics
of the digital age, 151 injunctive requests to prevent new media expressions which
have not yet been published will likely be rare. For instance, the guideline for
journalists set forth in the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, to
"[d]iligently seek subjects of news coverage to allow them to respond to criticism
147

See Einisman, supra note 10, at 206.
See, e.g., Scott P. Kramer, The Intersection between Social Media Speech and Domestic
Violence: Tweeting Harassment, 28 CBARECORD 34 (Apr./May 2014).
149
Bambauer, supra note 31, at 872-73.
150
/d. at 930.
151
See supra Part II.
148
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or allegations ofwrongdoing,"152 does not reflect the practice among bloggers who
are not professional journalists. Requesting a response from subjects ofcoverage can
allow them time to apply for an injunction against publication.
Concerns with respect to the issuance of permanent and temporary judicial
orders regarding publications that have already been distributed have increased in
significance in the digital age. 153 It may be claimed that an injunction of that kind
is not necessarily unconstitutional under the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, since the
restraint of speech is not "prior"; rather, it takes place after the publication has been
distributed or displayed for a time. 154 However, this argument alone is not persuasive. Removing an expression published on a medium with an eternal nature reduces
its public visibility, starting from the time ofremoval.m Such removal will not be
hermetic due to the characteristics of the Internet, and some accessibility to the
expression will remain. 156 In spite of these concerns, this remains a prior restraint.
As referenced previously, 157 even if case law provides certain indications that an
injunction with respect to publication may be legitimate if granted in the framework
of a fmal judgment, and not as a temporary remedy, these indications are not conclusive and the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue.
However, the special characteristics of the new media justifY, as in other areas
where the constitutional legitimacy of prior restraints of speech has already been
recognized,158 a flexible judicial manner. This is certainly the case with respect to
Society ofProfessional Journalists Code ofEthics, SPJ (Sept 6, 2014,4:49 PM), https://
www.spj .org/ethicscode.asp [https://perma.cc/CC5F-ffi6F].
153
See supra Part II.
154
See Peled, supra note 136, at 385 n.423.
m See, e.g., Ardia, supra note 33, at 82 ("An injunction likely would have its greatest utility
in situations where there is a danger ofrecurrent violation by the defendant and the speech has
not been widely disseminated. Surprisingly, a number ofdefendants have actually conceded
that they would continue to defame the plaintiffabsent a court order enjoining their behavior.
In such situations, an injunction prohibiting the defendant from continuing to publish his
defamatory speech might be an effective remedy.... An injunction may also be a useful and
appropriate remedy ifthe defamatory material is only circulating within a limited community
and the injlDl.Ction prohibits dissenllnation of the speech outside that community.... [A]n injunction may be an effective remedy where the defendant has created banners, distributed
flyers, posted billboards, or has otherwise communicated the defamatory speech only to a
limited audience.").
156
See Stacey B. Steinberg, Sharenting: Children's Privacy in the Age ofSocial Media,
66 EMORYL.J. 839, 872 (2017) (arguing that ''remedies could potentially require parents to
delete offensive material from Internet sites they own, but this would do little to control the
information shared on sites not owned or controlled by the parent. Additionally, these
remedies would be ineffective in many cases where the material has been downloaded or
shared by third parties and would offer little protection to a child who is already emotionally
harmed by viral online disclosure. Furthermore, once information is shared, despite its future
deletion, companies might retain the previously available data").
157
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
151
See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
152
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permanent injunctions for the removal of expressions. It is also the case in appropriate exceptional cases that pertain to temporary removal orders. A combination of
factors--including the increased chilling effect of subsequent sanctions on ordinary
speakers/ 59 the lesser impact ofjournalistic ethics on bloggers/60 the ease and immediacy of new media publications, 161 the eternity of such publications, 162 broad
access to the new media, 163 virality of speech, 164 and the technical ability to separate
protected from unprotected speech in the digital age165-makes prior restraint in the
digital age essentially different from the restraint anticipated by the drafters of the
traditional Doctrine of Prior Restraint.
Prior restraint of speech, including speech on the Internet, is not a trivial matter.
It requires deep thought and careful judicial discretion. Despite the traditional
equitable principle that the granting of preliminary relief is largely subject to the
discretion of the court, a court that grants preliminary relief against expression
should expect no deference in the course of appellate review. 166

B. Retraction and Injunction Requests as a Condition for Damages
In order to reduce the chilling effect and give speakers the freedom to choose
whether to take the risk of subsequent sanctions, we propose that the awarding of
damages for harm caused by unprotected speech in the new media be made contingent upon submitting a request for retraction to the offending party, and if he or she
refuses, filing an application for an injunction or a removal order. If such a request
is made, and the offending party removes the publication, damages will be imposed
only for injuries caused until removal.
The sub-constitutional Mitigation offiamages (Avoidable Consequences) Doctrine
precludes an injured party from recovering damages for losses that he or she could
reasonably have avoided. 167 If a plaintiff can reasonably take measures to eliminate
damages, rather than merely minimizing them, the Doctrine requires him or her to
do so. 168 Similar to the Mitigation of Damages Doctrine, 169 in many states, the request
159

See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.
161
See supra Section II. C.
1
~ See supra Section II.D.
163
See supra Section II.D.
164
See supra Section II.D.
165
See supra Section II.E.
166
See Redish, supra note 18, at 88-89.
167
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory
ofContractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 967 n.2 (1983). See also YehudaAdar, Comparative Negligence and Mitigation ofDamages: Two Sister Doctrines in Search ofReunion,
160

31 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 783, 792 {2013).
168
Douglas H. Cook, Personal Responsibility and the Law of Torts, 45 AM. U. L. REv.
1245, 1253 (1996).
169
See Donna M. Murasky, Avoidable Consequences in Defamation: The Common-Law

2019]

PRIOR RESTRAINT IN 1HE DIGITAL AGE

1179

for retraction serves, according to legislation or case law, as a criterion for determining whether a libel suit was filed in good faith. 170 Like the general Mitigation of
Damages Doctrine, the burden ofrequesting retraction, which is incumbent upon the
plaintiff in a defamation action, is "to 'use such means as are reasonable under the
circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages. "'171 This sub-constitutional state
law applies to defamatory publications in the new media as well. 172
We suggest that constitutional status be granted to the Mitigation of Damages
Doctrine with respect to speech in the new media. Seeking damages for violation of
an anti-speech entitlement, such as the rights to good reputation, privacy, and intellectual property (to the extent that the intellectual property that was harmed conflicts
with freedom of expression), will be contingent upon a retraction request, and if the
request is not accepted by the defendant, by a plea for injunction or a removal order.
A plaintiff has a primary right for a defendant not to act unlawfully; this right
should ideally be protected by injunction and only as a second-best remedy to
damages. 173 The traditional Doctrine of Prior Restraint bars prohibition on speech
issued in advance ofpublication, principally because ofthe fear of freezing the expression or of postponing it if the specific expression is time-sensitive. 174 This rationale
itselfsupports making damages contingent upon the plaintiff's prior demand to remove
the speech from the Internet. The need to prevent chilling of expression and to
preclude deterring ordinary people from expressing themselves in the new media,
while respecting their freedom of choice, makes it necessary for persons who believe
that their rights have been violated by an unprotected speech in the new media to
first demand the removal of that speech. Only if this demand is rejected will the
injured party be entitled to claim damages for the harm caused by the speech.
Duty to Request Retraction, 40 RUTGERSL.REv.167, 175-76 (1987) (assertingthat"[i]nthe
case ofdefamation, the rationale for the rule applies with particular force. A retraction, ifgranted,
not only may remedy and prevent economic loss but also, and perhaps more important, is likely
to be the best method of curing a loss that is not easily measured in monetary terms-that
ofvindicating the reputation of a person who has been falsely accused of some misdeed'').
170
See, e.g., John C. Martin, The Role ofRetraction in Defamation Suits, 1993 U. Cm.
LEGAL F. 293,294 (pointing out that "[t]raditionally, retraction has served as evidence of an
absence of malice as revealed in both case law and state statutes. Similarly, a refusal to retract has sometimes been used to buttress allegations that a defendant published a defamatory
article maliciously").
171
See Allison E. Horton, Beyond Control? The Rise and Fall ofDefamation Regulation
on the Internet, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1265, 1293 (2009) (quoting C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF
DAMAGES 127 (1935)).
172
See Je:fiKosse~ Private or Public? Eliminating the Gertz Defamation Test, 2011 U.
Ill.. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 249, 267--68.
173
Kenneth W. Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine ofContributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1693, 1705--06 (1995).
174
See Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,561 (1976) ("As a practical matter,
moreover, the element oftime is not unimportant if press coverage is to fulfill its traditional
function of bringing news to the public promptly.").
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The court that hears the motion for injunction or removal order will have to
exercise careful discretion while attributing considerable weight to First Amendment
values. The need to effectively protect the First Amendment values also dictates the
awarding of damages for harm caused by expression in the new media only after
careful judicial consideration. The court should be convinced that, under the circumstances of the case, it was not appropriate to order the removal ofthe expression and
thereby prevent the chilling effect of the damages.
CONCLUSION

The Doctrine of Prior Restraint in the United States is rooted in nineteenthcentwy cases from state courts, which recognized and implemented protections against
prior restraints as integral components of state constitutional provisions. 175 The
Doctrine as it stands today was formulated almost nine decades ago, in the 1931 Near
v. Minnesota Supreme Court decision. 176 Over the years, a technological revolution
has taken place; this revolution gave rise to the digital age, one of the main manifestations of which is the new media.
While the major rationales of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint have not changed
in the digital age, the characteristics of the new media require a reshaping of the
Doctrine. The required reshape does not result from a change in the rationales of the
Doctrine, but rather, from the need to promote them in the digital age.
The new media increase the risk to freedom of expression and the marketplace
of ideas as a result of subsequent sanctions on unprotected expressions. 177 At the
same time, the new media also increase the harm caused by unprotected expression
to rights including the right to good reputation and the right to privacy. 178 These
implications stem from the combination of the increased chilling effect of subsequent sanctions on ordinary speakers in the new media, the lesser impact ofjournalistic ethics on ordinary bloggers, the ease and immediacy of publication, the eternal
nature of new media speech, the broad access to it, and the technical ability to
separate protected from unprotected speech. 179
The flexibility and indeterminability of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint has
enabled its adaptation in the past to changing social needs. 180 These attributes of the
Doctrine also allow it to be reshaped in order to suit the digital age. In light of the
combination of the new media characteristics, we propose a two-component reshaping of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint: first, empowering courts to issue orders to
remove new media expressions and, in exceptional cases, to issue injunctions against
175
176

177
178

179

180

Meyerson, supra note 1, at 1087.
Nearv. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part I.
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unpublished expressions; and second, granting speakers freedom to choose whether
to take the risk of subsequent sanctions by constitutionalizing the Mitigation of
Damages Doctrine with respect to speech in the new media.
"Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand stil1."181 This famous insight182 by
Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School from 1916 to 1936, 183 is particularly apt
in the field of constitutional law. Indeed, ''to keep our constitutions vital, we must ensure that the law is stable but never stands sti11." 184 In order to maintain the stability
of the values underlying the Constitution in the digital age, some change of its
interpretation is needed. This is the aim of the proposed reshape of the Prior Restraint Doctrine.

181
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ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923).

See, e.g., The Honorable Roger J. Miner,A Significant Symposium, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 15, 16 (2009--2010).
183
See Deans ofHarvard Law School, HARv. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/aboutlhis
tory/hls-deans [https://perma.cc/UH8V-8B9J] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
184
The Honorable Margaret H. Marshall, "Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from
their Children": Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age ofGlobal Jurisprudence, 19 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1633, 1655 (2004). See also Robert B. McKay, Stability and Change in Constitutional
Law, 17 V AND. L. REv. 203, 203 (1963) (''The lawregards change merely fortbe sake ofchange
with suspicion, demanding in tbe name of stare decisis special justification for departure from
tbe past. But tbe law also has its moments ofmovement, particularly in tbe ever-shifting domain
of constitutional law.").

